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Abstract
This paper examines whether inward FDI incentives can soften the politi-
cal constraints associated with trade liberalization. After introducing the role
of capital in‡ows into the political economy of trade framework pioneered by
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996), the paper traces the e¤ects of
FDI incentives on the politically sustainable equilibrium level of trade protec-
tion. In particular, the paper shows that FDI incentives reduce the politically
sustainable level of trade protection when capital-owners are politically orga-
nized, while they inhibit the process of trade liberalization when labor is the
main in‡uential political force. Welfare implications are also considered.
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11 Introduction
There are many reasons why the interlinkages between trade and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) have become a much-discussed topic. First, the sheer size of these ‡ows
makes them di¢cult to ignore. Estimates suggest that over the period 1973-1995,
the value of annual FDI global out‡ows increased by 12 fold (from US$25 billion to
US$315 billion), while the value of merchandise exports multiplied by eight-and-half
times (from US$575 billion to US$4,900 billion) over the same period.1 Second, FDI
is often seen as one of the main forces feeding the ongoing integration process of the
world economy. According to the WTO, the increased importance of foreign-owned
production, together with the more or less steady rise in the trade-to-GDP ratio, are
”tangible evidence of globalization” (WTO, 1996, p.15).
Traditionally, an open and liberalized investment regime was regarded as an im-
portant feature determining the attractiveness of a country as a desirable destination
for FDI. According to the 1996 UNCTAD report on FDI, although this feature re-
mains important, it no longer constitutes the predominant element in the determina-
tion of FDI destination. Indeed, countries have greatly liberalized their FDI policies,
which, as a result, have become increasingly similar. Today, host governments of-
fer extensive investment incentive schemes to di¤erentiate themselves as desirable
locations for FDI. These incentive schemes include communications infrastructure,
marketing networks, favorable business and legal environments and access to inno-
vative capacity. Although earlier studies have argued that incentives do not play an
important role in attracting FDI (Reuber et al., 1973; Toye, 1978), their strong and
pervasive use across countries indicates the contrary.2 Recent empirical evidence sug-
gests that investment incentives can be signi…cant factors in in‡uencing …rms’ FDI
locational choices (Devereux and Freeman, 1995; UNCTAD, 1996b; Devereux and
Gri¢th, 1998).
Investment incentives comprise any measurable economic advantages a¤orded to
speci…c …rms or industries by a host government in an attempt to encourage inward
FDI. Di¤erent types of common FDI incentive measures are presented in Boxes below.
While countries di¤er greatly in both, the level and the type of incentives they propose
to attract FDI, these measures can be classi…ed into three broad categories, namely,
(i) …nancial incentives (see Box 1); (ii) …scal incentives (see Box 2); and (iii) indirect
incentives (see Box 3).
1For the most part, the leading investor countries were also the leading host countries for FDI.
In 1995, for example, of the total US$315 billion FDI ‡ows, US$203 billion went into OECD area
(WTO, 1996).
2Based on their extensive study of inward FDI incentives, Guisinger and Associates (1985) con-
clude that 50 of the 74 investment projects analyzed over 30 countries (DCs and LDCs) had been
in‡uenced by host government incentives. Woodland and Rolfe (1993) present a similar view for
inward FDI in the Caribbean countries.
2Box 1: Financial Incentives
² Direct subsidies to lower investment-related cost.
² Subsidized loans.
² Loan guarantees.
² Guaranteed export credits.
² Publicly funded venture capital participating in high-risk commercial
investment.
² Government insurance at preferential rates to cover risks related to
exchange rate volatility, currency devaluation, or expropriation and
political turmoil.
Incentives may be granted unconditionally or conditionally (e.g., upon perfor-
mance requirements); they may be granted automatically under certain conditions
or with discretion. Clearly, FDI incentives not only entail a …nancial burden (in the
form of cash outlays or lost revenues) to host governments but they also distort the
production structure and the allocation of capital in the host economy.
While the use of FDI incentives is more accepted in practice than in theory, the
literature o¤ers several theoretical justi…cations for them. The theory of externali-
ties (Pigou, 1920) is one of them. In the presence of production spillovers (such as
economies of scale, the creation or di¤usion of new technology, and skill up-grading),
social rates of return may di¤er from private rates of returns. To optimize social
welfare, a government may impose taxes/subsidies that cover this gap. Another ap-
proach interprets FDI incentives as a signaling device used by governments to indicate
a favorable investment environment (Ra¤ and Srinivasan, 1998). Alternatively, FDI
incentives can also result from intense competition between governments for foreign
capital (Mintz, 1990; UNCTAD, 1996b).
However, in the context of international trade, this literature sheds little light on
the interactions between tari¤s and FDI incentives. While a number of theoretical
models have addressed certain aspects of this issue, few have tackled the political
implications of FDI incentives, and how these, in turn, in‡uence the government’s set
of feasible actions in the context of trade policy. In fact, to our knowledge no paper
has traced directly the e¤ects of FDI incentives on the politically sustainable level of
trade protection. This is an important omission since both sets of policies are likely to
a¤ect the interests of the politically in‡uential interest groups, which, in turn, lobby
the government to protect their interests. Thus, the politically sustainable level of
trade protection cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of its economic merits from
a social welfare point of view, but it also needs to incorporate the political motives
of the concerned special interest groups.
3Box 2: Fiscal Incentives
² Reductions in and deductions from corporate income-tax rates.
² Accelerated depreciation allowances on capital taxes
² Reductions in social security contributions.
² Incentives based on value-added, including:
- income tax credits based on the net local content of outputs;
- income tax credits based on net value earned.
² Import-based incentives, including:
- tax credits for duties paid on imported material or supplies;
- exemptions from import duties on parts and inputs related to the
production process.
² Export-based incentives, including:
- exemptions from export duties;
- preferential tax treatment of income from exports;
- tax credits based on export performance;
- income-tax credits based on net local content of exports;
- income-tax reduction for foreign-exchange transactions.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop an analytical framework that
examines whether a government can mitigate the political opposition to trade liber-
alization by allowing interest groups to lobby not only over the equilibrium level of
trade protection but also over the equilibrium level of FDI incentives. To determine
the equilibrium policy outcome, we rely on the political economy of trade framework
pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996). Our model, however,
di¤ers from the original Grossman and Helpman framework in two major respects.
First, in addition to trade policy we introduce a second policy instrument (FDI incen-
tives) into the domestic policy-making process. This allows us to investigate whether
the presence of FDI incentives is likely to facilitate or to hamper trade liberalization.
Second, lobbying takes place among two types of factor owners (capital and labor)
belonging to the same sector (i.e., as opposed to sector-speci…c lobbying). Thus, in
our model, capital-owners and labor lobby jointly over the desired levels of tari¤s and
FDI incentives.
We obtain three sets of results. The …rst set of results concerns the conditions
under which FDI incentives soften the political constraints associated with trade
liberalization. In particular, lobbying over FDI incentives reduces the politically
sustainable level of trade protection when capital-owners are politically organized,
while it exacerbates the process of trade liberalization when labor represents the
main in‡uential political force. The intuition for this result goes as follows. While
both interest groups bene…t from trade protection, domestic capital owners are most
interested in preventing foreign capital in‡ows, which would reduce their market
share. Thus, in return for a reduction in the existing FDI subsidy, the capitalist
association is willing to accept a lower equilibrium level of trade protection. This is
4why, in the presence of strong lobbying by the capitalist association, FDI incentives
can mitigate political opposition against trade liberalization.
Box 3: Indirect Incentives
² Subsidized dedicated infrastructure.
² Subsidized services, including:
- collection of information related to domestic markets and availability
of raw material;
- assistance to identify sources of …nance, to manage projects and to
carry-out pre-investment studies.
² Preferential government contracts.
² Closing market to further entry and granting monopoly rights.
² Protection from import competition.
² Special treatment with respect to foreign-exchange, including:
- special exchange rates and foreign debt-to-equity conversion rates;
- elimination of exchange risks on foreign loans.
If, however, labor is the most in‡uential lobby group opposing trade liberaliza-
tion, introducing FDI incentives into the political arena does not soften the political
constraints associated with trade liberalization. While labor bene…ts from both, an
FDI subsidy and trade protection, the positive income e¤ects derived from trade pro-
tection exceed those derived from an FDI subsidy. Thus, if given the choice, the labor
union prefers to lobby for a relatively higher level of trade protection at the expense
of a relatively lower FDI subsidy. In this case, FDI incentives raise the equilibrium
level of trade protection and thereby lower the likelihood of implementing a successful
trade liberalization.
The second set of results concerns the welfare consequences of trade liberalization
associated with the introduction of FDI incentives. Our model suggests that when
both the capitalist association and the labor union participate in the political game,
the government achieves a higher level of social welfare if it allows interest groups to
lobby over a single policy instrument (tari¤s) rather than over two policy instruments
(tari¤s and FDI incentives). If, however, only one of the political groups is politically
active, the welfare e¤ects associated with the introduction of FDI incentives into the
political arena can be either positive or negative, depending on the parameter values.
Finally, the third set of results focuses on how political parameters a¤ect the gov-
ernment’s objective function and thereby, the optimal policy design. Our model sug-
gest that the highest level of policy intervention occurs when special interest groups
participate in the lobbying process, when the politically in‡uential groups represent a
relatively small fraction of the population and when the government places a relatively
large weight on political contributions.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. In particular, it presents the in‡uence-driven approach to the political
5economy of trade literature and discusses the main arguments underlying the rela-
tionship between FDI and trade protection. Section 3 outlines the basic framework
of the model, while the relevant derivations of the paper are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 performs a numerical simulation exercise, assuming a reasonable range for
the economic and political parameters of the model. The purpose of this numerical
simulation exercise is two-fold, namely, (i) to examine how optimal policy outcomes
are in‡uenced by the political parameters of the model; and (ii) to evaluate the wel-
fare consequences associated with the introduction of FDI incentives into the trade
policy decision-making process. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
In this section, we review quickly the main strands of the literature, which pertain to
the present paper. First, we present a brief overview of the in‡uence-driven approach
of the political economy of trade literature. Then, we present the main arguments
found in the literature, regarding the relationship between FDI and trade protection.
2.1 Political Economy of International Trade
While there exists an abundant and broad literature on the political economy of
trade, the present paper is set in the tradition of the in‡uence-driven approach.3
Pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996), this approach empha-
sizes campaign contributions (rather than election outcomes) as the primary motive
for in‡uencing policy choices. It stems from the empirical observation that special
interest groups often try to use campaign contributions to in‡uence politicians’ posi-
tions.4 In this context, political contributions can be thought of as either, campaign
contributions, …nancial bribes, or simply some demonstration of political support.
The government, on the other hand, is assumed to maximize a political objective
function which depends on both, the level of contributions it collects from the special
3In addition to the in‡uence-driven approach, the political economy of international trade liter-
ature can be classi…ed into four further approaches, namely, the tari¤-formation approach, which
links the degree of trade protection a¤orded to a special interest group to the amount of lobbying
resources deployed by this group relative to its competitors (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982); the political
support-approach, which views trade policy as the outcome of an optimizing problem in which the
government trades o¤ political support from special interest groups against the dissatisfaction of
all consumers (Hillman, 1982 and 1989; Long and Vousden, 1991); the direct democracy approach,
which views trade policy as the outcome of majority voting (Mayer, 1984); and the electoral compe-
tition approach, which views political contributions as a motive to promote the electoral prospect of
a preferred candidate (Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; Austen-Smith, 1991; Mayer and Li, 1994).
For excellent surveys of political economy of trade, see also Helpman (1997) and Rodrik (1995).
4For empirical support, Grossman and Helpman (1994) cite the work by Magelby and Nelson
(1990) where lobby groups are shown to be more likely to o¤er political contributions to incumbent
candidates (who are in a position to in‡uence policy outcomes), as opposed to political challengers
(whose actions can a¤ect election outcomes).
6interest groups and the well-being of the general public.5 The government chooses
its policy stance, knowing how each policy choice will a¤ect the amount of political
contributions it will receive from the various lobby groups.
In Grossman and Helpman (1994), trade policy is determined by only three vari-
ables (import elasticity, import-penetration ratio, and whether or not an industry
is represented by a lobby). This model predicts that: (i) trade protection is higher
in politically organized industries; (ii) trade protection is negatively related to the
import elasticity; (iii) trade protection is positively correlated to import penetration
in the case of non-organized groups, while it is negatively correlated in the case of
politically organized groups. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) test these predictions and
…nd that the model …ts the data reasonably well.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) study speci…cally how sector-speci…c lobbying of
owners of …xed factors in‡uence trade policy in a small open economy. While each
sector may be politically represented, only the owners of sector-speci…c factors lobby
for protection, leaving the interests of consumers unrepresented. In contrast, Rama
and Tabellini (1998) model a situation where di¤erent factor owners (capital and
labor) belonging to the same sector lobby the government over two distortionary
policies (tari¤s and a minimum wage). While the interests of capital and labor
coincide with respect to trade policy, they clash with respect to labor policy. In
equilibrium, lobbies are able to determine the direction of trade policy outcomes, but
…nd it much more di¢cult to in‡uence labor policy outcomes. This paper reveals the
importance of examining how one policy (say, trade policy) a¤ects the equilibrium of
another policy (minimum wage).
Using a similar framework, Magee (1998) examines how the existence of trade
adjustments assistance (TAA) a¤ects the equilibrium level of tari¤s and welfare in
an economy. The economy consists of two sectors, a declining sector and a rest-of-
economy sector. The declining sector uses both, labor and industry-speci…c capital
and the rest-of-economy sector uses only labor. Again, the government controls two
policy instruments: tari¤s and TAA, where TAA is modeled as a lump-sum payment
to workers who exit the declining sector. TAA are found to raise the equilibrium
tari¤ level and to lower welfare when the government cares highly about social welfare
relative to campaign contributions. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom of
international trade theory, which predicts that trade adjustment assistance, by paying
o¤ interest groups to reduce their lobbying e¤orts against trade liberalization, always
lowers the equilibrium level of tari¤s. Again, Magee’s paper highlights the need to
carefully examine how di¤erent policies a¤ect a government’s set of politically feasible
actions.
In the same spirit, the model presented below examines how the introduction
of FDI incentives into the lobbying game may strengthen or hamper the political
support for trade liberalization. Before turning to the basic framework of this pa-
5Grossman and Helpman (1996) present some theoretical underpinnings for this common speci-
…cation.
7per, we brie‡y discuss next the main theoretical and empirical issues regarding the
relationship between FDI and trade protection.
2.2 FDI and Trade Protection
A large body of economic literature has focused on the question as to why a foreign
…rm may choose to invest in a foreign market rather than to trade with it and, in
particular, whether trade crowds out or stimulates FDI.6 To date, the conventional
wisdom on this issue tends to perceive exports and FDI as complementary to each
other, rather than mutually exclusive.7 By and large, however, trade economists do
not seem to have participated much to the debate of how multinational ownership
a¤ects trade liberalization scenarios. There are, however, a few important exceptions.
Markusen (1997), for example, constructs a theoretical model to show how the
liberalization of trade may lead to quite di¤erent outcomes than the liberalization of
FDI, and how the combination of the two types of liberalization leads to quite di¤erent
outcomes than either alone. In his model, the simultaneous liberalization of trade
and investment is clearly welfare-improving. This would suggest a positive correlation
between a government’s willingness to implement trade liberalization policies and its
willingness to implement FDI-friendly policies.8 This result is largely supported by
the observation that the largest share of FDI takes place among developed countries,
which have also been the most forceful advocates of large regional trading blocs (such
as, the EU, the NAFTA and the ASEAN).
By modelling explicitly the use of FDI incentives, Motta and Norman (1996)
show that when a member country considers o¤ering investment incentives to extra-
regional …rms, both, the minimum subsidy needed to induce inward FDI and the
6In particular, to explain FDI activities, the literature relies on three broad hypotheses, namely,
(i) the factor-proportions hypothesis, which states that multinational …rms fragment production
across borders to exploit di¤erences in international factor prices due to divergences in factor endow-
ments (Helpman, 1985; Helpman and Krugman, 1985); (ii) the proximity-concentration hypothesis,
which focuses on a multinational …rm’s trade-o¤ between establishing production in close prox-
imity to customers and specializing production in one location (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992;
Brainard, 1997); and (iii) the internalization hypothesis, which assumes that multinationals possess
proprietary advantages, such as asymmetric information, control over quality and technology dif-
fusion (Ethier, 1986; Dunning, 1988; Ethier and Markusen, 1996). For a recent discussion on the
literature on multinational …rms and the theory of international trade, see Markusen (1995), Caves
(1996), Markusen and Venables (1996), and Lipsey (1999).
7While Lipsey and Weiss (1981, 1984) support the view that FDI and exports occur simultane-
ously, Ray (1989) presents slightly less conclusive results. See Caves (1996) for a general review.
More recently, Brainard (1997) presents convincing evidence that the share of foreign a¢liate sales
in the total of exports and a¢liate sales is positively related to trade barriers and transport costs.
8The author points out, however, that while governments may be keen to attract FDI, domestic
…rms may not all share their enthusiasm. This suggests that, if governments want to foster an
environment conducive to trade liberalization, they must take into account not only the social welfare
implications of their policies, but also the political and economic motivations of the economic agents
most likely to lobby against these policies.
8maximum subsidy willing to be paid on the part of the host country, decrease with
greater market accessibility (i.e., with lower intra-regional barriers to trade). Thus,
a country that considers o¤ering investment incentives to encourage FDI by extra-
regional …rms has an interest to ensure that intra-regional barriers to trade are as low
as possible.9 Here again, trade liberalization policies tend to be positively correlated
with pro-FDI policies. This result is consistent with the observation that the United
Kingdom has been a strong supporter to remove intra-regional barriers to trade, while
o¤ering signi…cant incentives to Japanese manufacturing …rms wishing to establish
operations in the EU.
So far, however, none of these treatments shed much light on the way in which
inward FDI may a¤ect the prospects of trade liberalization. In an attempt to …ll
this gap in the literature, some economists have pointed out that inward FDI may
play a special role in the determination of trade policy. The literature refers to
this phenomenon as either tari¤-jumping FDI (when FDI reacts to existing tari¤ or
non-tari¤ barriers) or quid-pro-quo FDI (when FDI responds to the threat of future
protectionist measures)10.
Ellingson and Wärneryd (1999), for example, show that import-competing in-
dustries may not always choose to extract the maximum level of trade protection
from the government. Rather, because inward FDI could be even less desirable than
import competition, domestic …rms want the highest level of protection that is con-
sistent with the foreign …rm staying abroad. Thus, according to their model, when
FDI presents an easy alternative to exporting, inward FDI may operate as a threat
and hence, may lower the optimal level of trade protection. Alternatively, however,
Blonigen and Ohno (1998) present a model where foreign …rms, which have already
located their production in the home country, try to increase the level of protection
to provide barriers against future foreign competitors. These seemingly contradictory
results highlight the importance of understanding not only the overall economic inter-
ests at stake but also the political motivations of the politically in‡uential members
of the society.
In this respect, Blonigen and Figlio (1998) present an interesting empirical work
examining the e¤ects of FDI on trade protection. By looking at how patterns of FDI
a¤ect U.S. congressional voting patterns on trade issues, they …nd compelling evidence
9As the authors point out, this set-up evades a important strategic dimension. For example,
if two noncooperative member countries compete for inward FDI, they will try to outbid their
competitors by o¤ering higher subsidies than they would under no competition. The winners are
the extra-regional …rms, who collect a larger subsidy.
10An often-cited example is the Japanese automobile industry, which began producing in the
United States and in the European Union following the imposition of the so-called ”voluntary export
restraint” (VERs) agreements. While Motta (1992) relies on the tari¤-jumping argument of FDI,
a standard model of explicit quid-pro-quo FDI is found in Bhagwati et al. (1992). Grossman and
Helpman (1996a) develop the notion of quid-pro-quo FDI in the context of the in‡uence-driven
approach to the political economy of trade literature. Further references are presented in Wong
(1995).
9that FDI in‡uences indeed legislators’ behavior, although not always in a way that
is consistent with the standard quid-pro-quo arguments. In particular, they …nd that
while inward FDI tends to soften the protectionist stance of those legislators, who
already exhibited a leaning towards free trade prior to the in‡ow of foreign capital,
it tends to strengthen the protectionist stance of those legislators, who started with
an anti-free trade position. Again, the asymmetric nature of these results opens up
important questions about the political-economy implications of domestic policies
and highlights the need to forge a better understanding of the pattern of political
support towards liberalization programs.
The present paper is not about examining the economic justi…cations of trade
versus FDI liberalization. Nor is it about presenting an economic rationale for why
a host government may wish to o¤er incentives to encourage FDI. But rather, the
purpose of this paper is to examine whether inward FDI incentives can soften the
domestic political constraints associated with trade liberalization. Indeed, to foster
an environment conducive to trade liberalization, a government must not only take
into account the social welfare implications of its policies, but it must also understand
the political and economic motivations of the people most a¤ected by these policies
and hence, most likely to lobby against these policies. Thus, we address how the
government’s willingness to introduce a second policy instrument (inward FDI incen-




Consider a small open economy with two sectors, which can be labelled, respectively,
agriculture and manufacturing. There are two factors in this economy, labor and
capital. No international migration is allowed. Thus, the total quantity of labor is
…xed and equal to L. Labor can be allocated either to the agricultural sector (la) or
to the manufacturing sector (l). The total stock of capital in this economy consists
of a fraction µ of domestically-owned capital and a fraction (1 ¡ µ) of foreign-owned
capital. The stock of domestic capital is assumed …xed. Thus, changes in the total
stock of capital can only be induced through international capital ‡ows.
The production of the agricultural good requires only labor, according to a con-
stant return technology. We assume that the labor supply, L is large enough to ensure
a positive output of this good. Then, we can normalize the competitive wage rate
to unity. Moreover, the price of the agricultural good is chosen as the numeraire.
Thus, while p¤ is the international price of the manufacturing good, the price of the
numeraire good is equal to one. The manufacturing sector uses both capital and
sector-speci…c labor. Without loss of generality, the manufacturing sector is assumed
to be made up of only one …rm, which uses a Cobb-Douglas technology of the type
10f(k;l) = kblc. This economy is small, in the sense that it can in‡uence neither the
international rate of return to capital, r¤, nor the international goods price, p¤. We
assume a perfectly competitive capital market, in the sense that the domestic rate of
return to capital is always equal to the international rate of return to capital (rd = r¤).
The government’s policy options are limited to two instruments, namely, (i) ad-
valorem trade tari¤s/subsidies, and (ii) ad-valorem capital taxes/subsidies. Both of
these instruments drive a wedge between the international and the domestic prices.
In the case of trade protection, this wedge is represented by p ¡ p¤, where p = ¿p¤.
¿ > 1 represents one plus the tari¤ (subsidy) rate on the import (export) good,
while ¿ < 1 represents an import subsidy (export tax). Similarly, the capital policy
drives a wedge between the net (subsidy-inclusive) domestic rental rate of capital
and the international rental rate of capital, which is represented by rn ¡ r¤, where
rn = srd: If s < 1, capital is taxed and foreign capital ‡ows out of the domestic
economy. Alternatively, if s > 1, capital is subsidized and foreign capital ‡ows into
the domestic economy.
In this model, where the domestic stock of capital is …xed, the main role of a
capital subsidy is to induce foreign investors to invest their capital in the domestic
economy. Indeed, a capital subsidy, which raises the net (subsidy-inclusive) domestic
rental rate above the international rental rate, induces an in‡ow of foreign capital.
Under perfect capital markets, this in‡ow of foreign capital occurs instantaneously
and until the net (subsidy-inclusive) rental rate is equal to the international rental
rate (or, until rn = r¤). The domestic capital owners, who always receive r¤; are
una¤ected by the capital subsidy and the capital tax/subsidy always act as an FDI
tax/subsidy.
Finally, through these two instruments, the government collects tari¤ revenues
and capital transfers and redistributes the government surplus equally among the
total population using a (neutral) head tax/subsidy.
3.2 Political Structure
Total population is made up of N individuals. Individuals are assumed to hold only
one type of endowment, either labor or capital. This implies that capital owners do
not need to work as wage earners to make a living. Each domestic citizen collects
income from two sources. She earns the return to her individually-owned factor of
production. She also receives a fraction of government surplus, which consists of the
sum of consumer surplus, tari¤ revenues and capital transfers.
There are inherent con‡icts between the agents in an economy. For example,
while producers bene…t from a higher prices for their own products, they prefer a
lower price for the goods for which they are net consumers. We assume that some
of these agents are able to overcome the free-rider problem associated with collective
action (Olsen, 1965). As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), this process is treated as
exogenous. Thus, a fraction ®k of the voting population is organized in a capitalists’
11association, while a fraction ®l is member of a labor union. Individual factor owners
enter the political process only as voters.11
As a group, factor owners can o¤er political contributions in an e¤ort to in‡u-
ence policy outcomes. In‡uence-driven contributions are modeled as in Bernheim and
Whinston’s (1986) common agency problem.12 Special interest groups seek to maxi-
mize the well-being of their members. They express their preferred policy outcomes
in the form of contribution schedules. That is, for each possible policy outcome, they
present the incumbent government with a schedule of corresponding contributions.
It is assumed that the government maximizes a political objective function which de-
pends on both, the level of contributions it collects and the well-being of the general
public. Once the government chooses an action, all of the special interest groups
pay the contributions stipulated in their schedules. Thus, the government chooses
its policy stance, knowing how each policy choice will a¤ect the amount of political
contributions it will receive from the various lobby groups. An equilibrium requires
two conditions, namely, (i) that each lobby group o¤ers a contribution schedule which
maximizes the well-being of its members given the actions of the other lobbies, and (ii)
that the government chooses a policy outcome which maximizes its political objective
given the contribution schedules o¤ered by the lobbies.13
Note the crucial timing of this game. First, the lobby groups simultaneously com-
mit to their contribution schedules. Then, the government chooses its policy stance,
after having observed the structure of these political contributions. Although the
lobby groups play a non-cooperative Nash game with each other, they recognize that
the government ultimately chooses the policy which maximizes its political objective
function and thus, incorporate the impact of their own choices on the government’s
maximization problem.
The present model interprets policy outcomes as a trade-o¤ between the social
costs associated with distortionary policies and the bene…ts of these policies captured
by various political actors. While the latter is expressed in terms of the economic
parameters of the model, the former are expressed in terms of the political parameters
of the model.
11The government is not allowed to accept political contributions from foreigners. In footnote 10,
Grossman and Helpman (1995) discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption.
12In particular, in‡uence-seeking activities are modeled as a menu auction game, where bidders
announce a menu of o¤ers for various possible actions open to an auctioneer and then pay the bids
associated with the action selected (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). In the present context, special
interest groups (the principals) try to induce the government (the agent) to take an action that may
be costly for the government to perform.
13Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that under quasi-linear preferences, a noncooperative menu
auction between the principals yields an e¢cient equilibrium. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997)
generalize this result by demonstrating that even under general preferences, the agent’s actions yield
an e¢cient outcome for all players (that is, for both, the principals and the agent).
123.3 Government
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government maximizes a weighted
average of social welfare and of political contributions it receives from the various
lobby groups. Thus, the government maximizes
©(p;s) = aW(p;s) + Ck + Cl (1)
where Cx (for x = k, l) represents the compensation that the government collects
from lobby group x in return for a given policy action. a represents the ”government’s
weighting of a dollar of social welfare compared to a dollar of campaigning contri-
butions, considering both the perceived political value of funding and the indirect
cost associated with contributor’s loss of welfare” (Grossman and Helpman, 1995,
p.682).14 The larger a, the more weight is placed on the well-being of voters relative
to contributions. Gross social welfare (that is, pre-contributions) can be expressed
as the sum of aggregate income to each domestically-owned factors of production,
consumer surplus, tari¤ revenues and capital transfers.
W(p;s) = wala + wl + µs¼(p;s) + CS(p) + TR(p;s) ¡ (s ¡ 1)r
dk (2)
While the …rst term represents labor income in the agricultural sector, the second
term represents wage earnings to manufacturing workers, and the third term repre-
sents the fraction of income accruing to domestic capital owners. Gross capital rents
are given by ¼(p;s) = pf(k;l) ¡ wl, where p is the domestic relative price of the
manufacturing good. Consumer preferences are given by qa + u(q), where qa and q
represent, respectively, the quantity demanded of the agricultural and manufacturing
good. We assume that consumers have identical preferences, such that the utility
of a representative consumer is given by u(q) = [ªq ¡
q2
2 ] with the demand implic-
itly de…ned by u0[d(p)] = p: For simplicity, the demand for the manufacturing good
is assumed to take a simple linear form, d(p) = ª ¡ p: Assuming that all domes-
tic production is geared towards domestic consumption, consumer surplus can then
be expressed as CS(p) = Nfu[d(p)] ¡ pd(p)g. Tari¤ revenues are de…ned in the
usual way by TR(p;s) = (p ¡ p¤)[Nd(p) ¡ f(k;l)]. Finally, (s ¡ 1)rdk represents
the transfer payments from the government to capital owners resulting from the cap-
ital tax/subsidy. Note that this term is positive in the case of an FDI subsidy and
negative in the case of an FDI tax.
In equilibrium, the marginal change in policy x (for x = p; s) must raise contribu-
tions by just enough to o¤set the loss in social welfare due to the implemented policy
x. When determining the political equilibrium level of either FDI incentives or trade
14See Grossman and Helpman (1996) for a theoretical justi…cation. Empirically, Goldberg and
Maggi (1997) estimate a to be between 50 and 88 using 1983 data on US non-tari¤ barriers. Although
this estimate seems surprisingly high and may not taken at face value, it suggests that social welfare
has a substantial weight in the government’s objective.























This economy is comprised of two lobby groups, namely, (i) a capitalist association,
and (ii) a labor union. By assumption, agricultural workers do not engage in lobbying
activities to in‡uence economic policy outcomes. Each lobby group maximizes its net
income, that is, net of political contributions.
3.4.1 Capitalist Association
The objective of the capitalists’ association is to maximize the well-being of its mem-
bers, which is given by
Vk(p;s) = ¢k[µs¼(p;s)] + ®kfCS(p) + TR(p;s) + (1 ¡ s)r
dkg ¡ Ck (5)
where ¢k represents the fraction of capital owners that are organized politically
in an association. This parameter ranges between 1 and 0. If it is equal to one, every
domestic capital owners belongs to the association. If it is equal to zero, none of the
domestic capital owners are members of the association, in which case no association
exists.15 This parameter re‡ects the importance of the association, relative to the
total number of capital owners in the economy. The parameter ®k, on the other
hand, represents the fraction of voters belonging to the association and re‡ects the
size of the association, relative to the total voting population.
Capital owners may lobby for two reasons, namely, (i) to capture higher real
income as capital owners, and (ii) to promote their general interests as recipients of
government surplus. In the short-run, or, in the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI, capital
owners bene…t from trade protection because it raises the domestic price of their
manufacturing good. Since workers are assumed to be paid the marginal productivity
of their labor, …rms may have to pay higher wages following the increase in the
domestic price. Whether domestic capital owners or manufacturing workers bene…t
the most from trade protection in the short run depends largely on the technological
15This is drawn from Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), who assume a binary variable, which
equals to one if the group is organized politically and zero if it is not organized.
14parameters of production and eventually, on the bargaining power of the respective
groups. In the long run, higher trade barriers attract FDI. After the complete re-
optimization of the manufacturing production process, the income of domestic capital
owners returns to that under free trade. Nevertheless, capital owners may still support
trade protection in the long run, and especially so if the ownership of capital is loosely
concentrated. This is because import tari¤s enter as tari¤ revenues, which are re-
distributed equally among the population, of which capital owners make up a large
percentage.
Capital owners favor capital subsidies, as long as capital markets are either closed
or when there is some rigidity in the domestic capital markets which prevents the
domestic rental rate from instantaneously equalizing the international rental rate. In
the long run, however, once foreign capital has ‡own into the country up to the point
where the net domestic rental rate (i.e., inclusive of the capital subsidy) equals the
international rental rate, domestic capital owners do not gain directly from a capital
subsidy. Indirectly, however, they bear a fraction of the cost of subsidies. Thus,
if the ownership of capital is highly concentrated, domestic capital owners may not
value very much this cost, of which they bear a relatively small proportion. Instead,
they may support capital subsidies in order to reap the short run pro…ts from trade
protection.
The capitalist association designs its contribution schedule so as to maximize the
well-being of its members, Vk(p;s). In equilibrium, the marginal change in politi-
cal contributions must equal the change in the association’s gross welfare associated
with the implementation of FDI incentives. The association’s contribution sched-
ules that map possible FDI incentives and trade policy outcomes into corresponding



































Contribution schedules that are di¤erentiable at least around their equilibrium
points, are referred to as locally truthful (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). This means
that in the neighborhood of the equilibrium the contribution schedules re‡ect the true
preference of the lobby groups and are stable to non-binding communication among
the players (i.e., they are ”coalition-proof”). Local truthfulness is an important
property of this model. It provides a microeconomic justi…cation for modeling the
government’s behavior as maximizing a social welfare function that ”weights di¤erent
members of society di¤erently, with individuals represented by a lobby group receiving
a weight of (1 + a) and those not so represented receiving the smaller weight a”
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p.841).
153.4.2 Labor Union
The objective of the labor union is to maximize the well-being of its members, which
is given by
Vl(p;s) = ¢l(wl) + ®lfCS(p) + TR(p;s) + (1 ¡ s)r
dkg ¡ Cl (8)
where ¢l represents the fraction of manufacturing workers that belong to the labor
union. This parameter can range anywhere between 1 and 0. While this parameter
re‡ects the signi…cance of the union, relative to the total labor pool in the economy,
®l re‡ects the size of the union, relative to the total voting population.
Manufacturing workers lobby for two reasons, namely, (i) to earn higher wages and
(ii) to maximize their general interests as recipients of government surplus. Generally,
the labor union will tend to support both, trade protection and capital subsidies.
Since the wage in the manufacturing sector is determined by the marginal productivity
of labor in this sector, manufacturing workers’ income is positively related to the
domestic price and to the total capital stock. In the long run, workers gain from an
in‡ow of capital, whether induced through FDI incentives or through higher tari¤
walls. In the short run, the net bene…ts accruing to labor depend largely on the
technological parameters and on the union’s relative bargaining power. Nevertheless
it is true that unless the increase in worker’s real income is large enough to outweigh
the deadweight losses caused by trade protection and/or FDI incentives, the labor
union will oppose policy intervention.
The labor union designs its contribution schedule so as to maximize the well-
being of its members, Vl(p;s). In equilibrium, the marginal increase in political
contributions must be equal to the marginal increase in the union’s well-being. In
equilibrium, the union’s contribution schedules that map possible FDI incentives and




































So far, we have set-up the basic framework for our analysis. Now, we can investigate
the political and economic motivations underlying a government’s trade-o¤ between
attracting FDI and erecting trade barriers. This is done in three steps. First, in
Section 4.1 we derive the optimal level of trade protection, assuming an exogenous
16level of FDI incentives. For the sake of completeness, we di¤erentiate between the
case when FDI does not respond to higher tari¤ barriers (a phenomenon referred
to as non-tari¤-jumping FDI behavior) and the case when FDI responds to higher
trade protection (a phenomenon referred to as tari¤-jumping FDI behavior). Then,
in Section 4.2, we consider the equilibrium level of FDI incentives, assuming an ex-
ogenous level of trade protection. Finally, in Section 4.3, we relax both exogeneity
assumptions and determine the joint optimal levels of FDI incentives and of trade
protection. In particular, for each level of FDI incentives, we derive the corresponding
optimal level of import tari¤s and vice-versa, for each level of trade protection, we
derive the corresponding optimal level of FDI incentives. Let us start now with the
optimal trade policy, assuming an exogenous level of FDI incentives.
4.1 Lobbying for Trade Protection
According to the basic framework presented in Section 3, we can solve for the equi-
librium level of trade protection;p; by optimizing the government’s objective func-
tion and by solving it recursively, taking the contribution schedules of the respective
lobbying groups as given. In particular, this implies substituting the lobbyists’ re-
spective contribution schedules given in equations (7) and (10) into the government’s
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Expression (11) is consistent with the political equilibrium level of trade protec-
tion derived in Grossman and Helpman (1994). In particular, it expresses the political
support motives for trade protection as a balancing act between the deadweight loss
associated with lower import demand and the income gains captured by special in-
terest groups. But in contrast to the political economy of trade function derived in
the original 1994 Grossman and Helpman model, equation (11) accounts explicitly
for the interactions between trade protection and foreign capital in‡ows.
While the denominator expresses the deadweight loss associated with lower im-
port demand, the numerator expresses the income gains captured by special interest
groups. In particular, the …rst term in the numerator represents the wage e¤ect from
trade protection. Ceteris paribus, the equilibrium trade protection is higher, the more
the government values social welfare and the stronger is the labor union.
The second term in the numerator represents the way in which foreign capital
in‡ows a¤ect the returns to the domestic capital owners. As will be shown below,
this depends on whether or not FDI is used as a means to overcome high tari¤ barriers.
17All else equal, the optimal trade policy is higher the larger is the fraction of domestic
producers that bene…t from the policy (the higher µ), the more the government values
social welfare (the higher a), the stronger is the capital association (the higher ¢k)
and the higher is the level of FDI incentives (the higher s).
Finally, the third term in the numerator represents the deadweight loss associated
with both, production distortions and the subsidy transfers that the government
pays to foreign capital owners in return for investing their capital in the domestic
economy. Ceteris paribus, the equilibrium level of trade protection is higher if the
weight placed on the deadweight loss is small, that is, if the government places a
relatively high value on political contributions (low a) and if the politically organized
groups are small (small ®t).
Note that the optimal trade policy outcome given in equation (11) is expressed as a
function of an exogenous level of FDI incentives, s. The …xed level of FDI incentives
allows us to focus on the optimal policy outcomes, when the politically in‡uential
groups of the economy is able to in‡uence only trade policy. The assumption of an
exogenous FDI policy, however, will be relaxed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
In order to answer the main question addressed in this paper, namely, whether
the presence of FDI incentives in‡uences the politically sustainable level of trade
protection, we need to solve for the optimal trade policy as a function of the economic
and political parameters of the model. For the completeness of our analysis, we
di¤erentiate between a situation where FDI is used as a means to ’jump’ trade barriers
(i.e., tari¤-jumping FDI) and a situation where FDI is not used to overcome trade
protection (i.e., non-tari¤-jumping FDI behavior).
4.1.1 In the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI
In the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI, foreign capital is not lured into the domestic
economy through higher trade barriers and trade protection does not induce an in‡ow
of foreign capital (i.e., @k=@p = 0).16 In this case, domestic capital owners and
manufacturing labor may both bene…t fromtrade protection. Domestic capital owners
bene…t if they can charge a higher price for the manufacturing good, while workers
bene…ts if they are paid their higher value marginal productivity. Which of the two
groups bene…ts relatively more from trade protection is determined ultimately by the
groups’ respective bargaining power. Thus, modifying equation (11) to account for





@p + f[(a + ¢k)µ ¡ (a + ®t)]s ¡ (a + ®t)gbf(k;l)
¡(a + ®t)Nd0 (12)
16Under non-tari¤ jumping FDI, trade protection does a¤ect neither the domestic capital stock
(@k=@p = 0) nor the market share of domestic capital owners (µp = 0). Thus, the economic e¤ects
of trade protection are mitigated in the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI.
18According to equation (12), the equilibrium policy outcome yields a positive level
of trade protection when the deadweight loss associated with trade protection (the de-
nominator) does not exceed the bene…ts of trade protection enjoyed by the politically
organized groups (the nominator).
To understand which political and economic factors in‡uence the optimal FDI
and trade policies, we need to solve equation (12) as a function of the parameters of
the model. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function (with both technological
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Equation (13) expresses the optimal level of trade protection as a function of
an exogenous level of FDI incentives, s; when FDI ‡ows do not respond to trade
protection. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that there is a positive rela-
tionship between the optimal level of trade protection derived in equation (13) and






f(¢l ¡ ®t) + 2[(µ ¡ 1)a + ¢kµ ¡ ®t)]sg > 0
Although a meaningful interpretation of this result would require a full numerical
simulation, under a reasonable set of parameters (which we present in Section 5
below), it would be easy to show that this inequality does not hold . In view of our
…nal results, we can summarize this intermediary result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI, a rise in the exogenous level of
FDI incentives generally lowers the politically sustainable level of trade protection.
Let us turn next to the case where FDI responds to higher import tari¤s.
4.1.2 In the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI
In the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI, higher tari¤ walls attract foreign capital (i.e.,
@k=@p > 0). This raises workers’ wage without altering the factor income of domes-
tic capital owners (respectively, @w=@p > 0 and @rd=@p = 0).17 Thus, while trade
17There are two reasons why, in the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI behavior, the domestic capital
owners do not bene…t from trade protection, namely: (i) because in response to trade protection,
foreign capital ‡ows into the country until the net rate of return to capital (i.e., subsidy-inclusive)
is equal again to the international rate of capital, such that in the new equilibrium, @rd=@p = 0;
and (ii) because the in‡ow of foreign capital, which raises the level of domestic production, is
accompanied by an equivalent loss in domestic market share for the domestic capital owners (i.e.,
rd@k=@p + µprdk = 0).
19protection bene…ts unambiguously manufacturing workers, it leaves capital owners’
factor income unchanged. Nevertheless, domestic capital owners may still experience
a net income loss in the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI. This is because, by exacer-
bating the deadweight loss and by increasing subsidy transfer payments to foreign
capital owners, import tari¤s reduce the government surplus, which, in turn, reduces
the welfare of domestic capital owners.
After adjusting equation (11) to account for the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI,
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Overall, the equilibrium level of trade protection is higher the more organized
is the manufacturing labor, the more wages increase following a capital in‡ow, the
more concentrated is the factor ownership, the lower is the FDI subsidy, and the less
tari¤-jumping FDI occurs. To see this more clearly, we can solve equation (14) as
a function of both, an exogenous level of FDI incentives and the other political and
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It is easy to show that the politically sustainable level of trade protection derived
in equation (15) is positively related to the exogenous level of FDI incentives, s,
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Again, although a meaningful interpretation of this result would require a full
numerical simulation, it would be easy to show that, under a reasonable set of pa-
rameters (which we discuss in Section 5 below), this inequality does not hold. Let us
state this intermediary result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the presence of tari¤-jumping, a rise in the exogenous level of FDI
incentives generally lowers the politically sustainable level of trade protection.
So far, we have determined the way in which economic and political parameters
a¤ect the optimal trade policy, assuming an exogenous level of FDI incentives. Let us
now turn this problem up-side-down and examine how economic and political factors
in‡uence the optimal FDI policy, assuming an exogenous level of trade policy.
204.2 Lobbying for FDI Incentives
According to the basic framework presented in Section 3, we can determine the equi-
librium FDI policy (s) by optimizing the government’s objective function and by
solving it recursively, taking the contribution schedules as given. This implies substi-
tuting the lobbyists’ respective contribution schedules expressed in equations (6) and
(9) into the government’s …rst-order condition given in equation (3). This yields the
following equilibrium level of FDI incentives:
s =
















¡ (a + ®t)
h






@s ) ¡ (a + ¢k)
h
µ(rd @k
@s + k @rd
@s ) + µsrdk
i
The intuition behind this result is the following. The …rst two terms on the
numerator represent the income gains captured by the lobbying groups. Ceteris
paribus, both domestic capital owners and manufacturing labor can bene…t from a
capital subsidy. While the former bene…ts if the subsidy increases the returns to
capital, the latter bene…ts if the subsidy induces a capital in‡ow, which in turn raises
their wages. Note that in the context of our model, an FDI subsidy generates an
instantaneous in‡ow of foreign capital up to the point where the net domestic rate
of return (i.e., inclusive of the subsidy) equals again the international rate of return
(until srd = r¤). Thus, domestic capital owners do not bene…t directly from FDI
incentives.
The third term on the numerator represents the loss associated with trade distor-
tions. Indeed, under an exogenous level of trade protection, FDI incentives induce an
in‡ow of foreign capital, which raises the domestic production of the manufacturing
good and thus, distorts import demand. Note, however, that equation (16) assumes
an exogenous level of protection, p: This parameter can range anywhere between one
(in the case of free trade) and a positive number larger than one (in the case of trade
protection). This exogeneity assumption, however, will be relaxed in the next section,
when we allow both, FDI incentives and trade policy to be determined endogenously.
The last term on the numerator represents the ine¢ciencies that result from FDI
incentives. For example, FDI incentives induce subsidy transfer payments to foreign
capital owners, cause manufacturing production to be more capital-intensive and re-
duce the domestic rate of return to capital. The relative cost of these ine¢ciencies
depends on both, the government’s relative preferences between social welfare and
political contributions and the concentration of factor ownership. Finally, the …rst
term on the denominator represents the way in which FDI incentives a¤ect the gov-
ernment surplus, while the second term illustrates the way in which FDI subsidies
a¤ect the factor income of domestic capital owners.
21Even at this level of generality, it is already possible to see from equation (16)
that the equilibrium of FDI incentives will be higher, the more (less) organized is
the labor union (the domestic capital association) (respectively, the higher ¢l and
the lower ¢k), the more concentrated is the factor ownership (the lower the ®0s), the
stronger is the wage e¤ect following an in‡ow of foreign capital and the slower the
domestic rental rate of capital adjusts to a capital in‡ow.
Equation (16) highlights the fact that an equilibrium policy outcome is a¤ected
by the way in which the relative bene…ts and losses associated with this policy are
valued and that this valuation, in turn, is determined by the political structure of the
economy. Thus, it is of relevance to introduce a political dimension into the economic
analysis of domestic policy-making, and in particular when it relates to politically
sensitive policy areas.
Again, expression (16) can be solved as a function of the political and economic
parameters of the model:
s =
(a + ®t)(b ¡
p¡p¤
p ) + (a + ¢l)b
(a + ®t)
(17)
where ®t = (®l + ®k). As expected, the equilibrium level of FDI incentives is
higher when labor is highly organized (high ¢l), when factor ownership is highly
concentrated (low ®t) and when the government does not value contributions very
much (low a).
According to equation (17), the equilibrium FDI policy outcome yields a positive
subsidy (s > 1) when the government attaches a greater weight to the presence
of lobbying than to the loss in government surplus that is borne by the politically
in‡uential groups (when ¢l > ®t). In other words, the government imposes an FDI
subsidy only if the political edge it gains by implementing this policy is greater than
the corresponding economic costs (in terms of lower government surplus).
Intuitively, the idea is that each special interest group lobbies for a given policy
if this policy raises its net income (i.e., factor income plus the corresponding share
of government surplus). But a policy not only alters the group’s factor income; it
also introduces a new source of economic distortions, which raises the deadweight
loss of the economy and hence, reduces the government surplus. It is because of this
reduction that the government …nds it more pro…table to implement a given policy
when the factor ownership of the lobbying groups is highly concentrated. Indeed,
the smaller is the share of the burden that the politically in‡uential groups bear as a
result of the distortionary policy, the less costly it is for the government to implement
this particular policy.
Finally, note that the optimal FDI policy is a capital tax, when no lobbying
takes place (when ¢l + ¢k = 0). Thus, if the interest groups are not particularly
adamant about raising their factor incomes, it is more pro…table for the government
to implement a capital tax and to redistribute the proceeds in the form of higher
government surplus.
22More generally, equation (17) states that the equilibrium level of FDI incentives
is higher under free trade (i.e., when p ¡ p¤ = 0) than under a positive level of trade
protection. In view of the main question addressed in this paper, namely, whether or
not the government can strengthen the political support for trade liberalization by
introducing FDI incentives into the lobbying game, this o¤ers an interesting insight.
Let us state this intermediary result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For an exogenous level of trade protection, the equilibrium level of
FDI incentives is higher under free trade than under a positive level of trade protec-
tion.
4.3 Lobbying for FDI Incentives & Trade Protection
In Section 4.1, we determine the politically sustainable level of trade protection,
assuming that the lobby groups can in‡uence only trade policy outcomes. But what
happens to this equilibrium level of trade protection, when the government introduces
FDI incentives into the political policy-making process?
To answer this question, we need to allow both trade policy and FDI policy to
be determined endogenously through lobbying. In other words, we need to solve
simultaneously for equations (11) and (16), so as to determine the optimal trade and
FDI policy outcomes as a function of the economic and political parameters of the
model. Again, and for the sake of completeness, we di¤erentiate between a situation
of tari¤-jumping and of non-tari¤-jumping FDI behavior. Let us turn …rst to the
former case.
4.3.1 In the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI
In the absence of tari¤-jumping FDI, we can obtain both, the optimal level of trade
protection and the optimal level of FDI incentives as a function of the parameters of
the model, by solving simultaneously equations (13) and (17). In particular, while the
equilibrium level of FDI incentives is given by the solution to the following quadratic
expression:
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the equilibrium level of trade protection is then determined by plugging the equilib-
rium level of FDI incentives derived in equation (18) back into equation (13). Given
23the algebraic messiness of this expression, we do not present its …nal solution here.
Nevertheless, we will use it later to perform a numerical simulation exercise, which
results are presented in Section 5 below.
4.3.2 In the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI
Similarly in the case of tari¤-jumping FDI behavior, we can derive both, the optimal
level of trade protection and the optimal level of FDI incentives as a function of
the parameters of the model, by solving simultaneously equations (17) and (15). In
particular, the equilibrium levels of trade protection and of FDI incentives are given,
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For given parameter values, we have the tools now to examine the endogenous
relationship between import tari¤s and FDI incentives. However, it would not be
fully satisfactory to end our analysis here. Indeed, from a social point of view, it
would be useful to shed light not only on how FDI incentives in‡uence the level
of trade protection, but also on how FDI incentives a¤ect social welfare. Hence,
we extend our analysis to analyze the welfare consequences associated with allowing
interest groups to lobby solely over trade policy, as opposed to allowing them to lobby
simultaneously over trade policy and FDI policy.
5 Welfare E¤ects
This section analyzes how various economic and political factors a¤ect policy out-
comes and highlights their welfare implications. To do this, we perform a numerical
analysis and examine which political characteristics are likely to make a country more
sympathetic towards trade liberalization. In the context of our model, we focus on
four parameters, namely, the weight that the government places on social welfare
relative to political contributions (a), the fraction of the population that is politically
in‡uential (®t) and the presence of lobbying by, respectively, the labor union (¢l) and
the capitalist association (¢k): For each of these parameters, we consider di¤erent
ranges, as indicated in Table 1 below.
The …rst column in Table 1 represents a, the weight that the government places
on social welfare relative to political contributions. We allow this parameter to vary
24between one and one hundred. If a = 1, the government applies an equal weight to
social welfare than to political contributions. As a becomes larger, the government
places a higher weight on the well-being of voters relative to political contributions.
When a = 100, the government values social welfare one hundred times more than it
values political contributions.
The second column represents ®t, the fraction of the population that is politi-
cally in‡uential. Although theoretically we di¤erentiate between ®k (the size of the
capitalist association) and ®l (the size of the labor union), the derivations presented
above show that only the aggregate size of the politically in‡uential groups matters.
We assume that this parameter ranges between 0 and 0.8. If ®t = 0:5, one half of the
population participates in the lobbying process.
The last two columns indicate whether or not the factor owners are politically
organized. For example, if ¢l is equal to one, every manufacturing worker belongs
to the labor union. Similarly, if ¢k is equal to zero, none of the capital owners are
members of the capitalist association and hence, the owners of capital do not lobby.
Table 1:
Parameter Range
a ®t ¢l ¢k
1 0.1 0 0
2 0.3 1 1
10 0.5 - -
100 0.8 - -
In Section 5 above, we derive the optimal level of trade protection both, when
interest groups in‡uence only trade policy (pns) and when they in‡uence simultane-
ously trade policy and investment policy (ps;s). Next, we want to focus on two set
of questions, namely: (i) whether the government can mitigate the political opposi-
tion to trade liberalization by introducing FDI incentives, and (ii) what the welfare
consequences of doing so are. To answer the …rst question, we need to compare the
equilibrium level of trade protection in the absence of FDI incentives (pns) with that
in the presence of FDI incentives (ps). In particular, inward FDI incentives soften
the political constraints associated with trade liberalization if pns > ps. For the sec-
ond question, we want to compare the social welfare when trade protection is the
government’s unique policy instrument, W(pns); with that when the government uses
both trade and investment policy instruments, W(ps;s). Introducing FDI incentives
is welfare-enhancing if WE = W(ps;s) ¡ W(pns) > 0:
To quantify the welfare e¤ects, a certain number of assumptions need to be made
concerning the …xed parameter values of the model. For instance, while the size of
the population is normalized to one hundred, the manufacturing sector is assumed to
25employ …fty percent of the total population.18 The stock of domestic capital (kd) is
…xed to one hundred. The international rate of return is set so as to equal the domestic
rate of return in a closed capital market framework. Thus, in the absence of both
FDI incentives and capital ‡ows, the domestic rate of return equals the international
rate of return and the domestic economy produces the manufacturing good only with
its …xed stock of domestically-owned capital. Given the assumptions of our model,
r¤ = 0:35. Finally, the international product price, p¤; is assumed to be one.
In accordance with our theoretical model, we di¤erentiate between the case where
trade barriers do not induce higher FDI and the case where FDI is used as a means
to overcome high tari¤ walls. Let us turn now to the former case, where FDI does
not respond to trade barriers.
5.1 In the Absence of Tari¤-Jumping FDI
In this section, we present the numerical simulation results for the case when FDI does
not respond to higher import tari¤s, which are given in Tables 2-4 below.19 While
Table 2 tabulates the results when the capitalist association is the only politically
active lobby group, Table 3 reverses the situation and assumes that only the labor
union is lobbying. Finally, Table 4 allows for both the capitalist association and the
labor union to in‡uence the domestic policy-decision making process.
In each of these Tables, column (1) presents the optimal level of trade protection
in the absence of FDI incentives (pns), which is derived in equation (13). The optimal
level of FDI incentives under free trade (sft);which is derived in equation (17) under
the assumption that (p¡p¤) = 0, is tabulated in column (2). The next two columns
introduce joint lobbying over trade protection and FDI policy. While column (3)
presents the optimal FDI subsidy under trade protection (stp);which is derived in
equation (18), column (4) presents its associated optimal level of import tari¤s (ps).
The last column represents WE; the welfare di¤erential between a regime where
lobbying takes place over both FDI and trade policy and a regime where lobbying
takes place only over trade policy (i.e., WE = W(ps;s) ¡ W(pns)).
Our numerical simulation highlight three key …ndings regarding the way in which
economic and political factors a¤ect the process of trade liberalization. While the
…rst …nding concerns the conditions under which FDI incentives soften the political
constraints associated with trade liberalization, the second …nding deals with the wel-
fare consequences of liberalizing trade in the presence of FDI incentives and the third
…nding focuses on how the political parameters of the model a¤ect the government’s
objective function and thereby its optimal policy design.
18In the case of tari¤-jumping FDI behavior, we restrict the manufacturing labor force to …ve
percent of the population. Although this restriction does not alter the content of our conclusions,
it allows to minimize the number of indeterminate solutions in our numerical simulations.
19The numerical simulations presented in this paper are run with a standard mathematical soft-
ware program, namely, Maple V Release 4 and hence, are easily reproducible with this particular
program or with any other comparable software programs.
26Our …rst …nding suggests that lobbying over FDI incentives reduces the politically
sustainable level of trade protection when capital-owners are politically organized,
while it exacerbates the process of trade liberalization when labor represents the
main in‡uential political force. Intuitively, this result is easy to interpret. While both
the capitalist and the labor interest groups bene…t from trade protection, domestic
capital owners do not bene…t directly from a capital subsidy, although they pay for
this policy indirectly by enjoying a lower government surplus. Thus, the capitalist
association is willing to accept a lower equilibrium level of trade protection in return
for a reduction in the existing FDI subsidy (or for an FDI tax). If, however, labor
is the most in‡uential lobby group opposing trade liberalization, introducing FDI
incentives into the political arena does not soften the political constraints associated
with trade liberalization. This is because while labor bene…ts from both, an FDI
subsidy and trade protection, the positive income e¤ects derived from trade protection
exceed those derived from an FDI subsidy. Thus, labor prefers to lobby for a higher
level of trade protection and the presence of FDI incentives does not mitigate the
political opposition against trade liberalization.
These results are shown in Tables 2-4 below. First, let us examine Table 2, where
the capitalist association is the only interest group participating in the policy decision-
making process (¢l = 0 and ¢k = 1). If trade policy is the only policy instrument
available, the optimal policy outcome yields a trade tax, provided that the capitalist
association represent less than …fty percent of the population (®t < 0:5). This is
shown in column (1) and supports the view that, in the absence of tari¤-jumping
FDI, the domestic capital owners bene…t from trade protection and hence, lobby for
it. But the government only yields to their demands if the deadweight loss associated
with trade protection is borne by a small fraction of the population (i.e., if ®t < 0:5).
If, however, the capitalist association were not allowed to lobby over trade pro-
tection but could lobby only over FDI incentives, the optimal FDI policy would yield
an FDI tax. This is shown in column (2). At …rst, this result may seem counter-
intuitive. We know that domestic capital owners do not bene…t directly from an FDI
subsidy/tax, because foreign capital ‡ows into the economy until the net (subsidy-
inclusive) domestic capital rate of return equals again the international rate of return.
Hence, we might have expected the capitalist association to be indi¤erent to an FDI
policy. Clearly, other forces are at work.20 Indeed, although the domestic capital
owners always earn the international capital rental rate of return, they contribute to
the payment of a subsidy in the case of an FDI subsidy, while they are handed back
a portion of the tax revenues in the case of an FDI tax.21 Thus, domestic capital
20Note that the highest equilibrium FDI tax levels occur when the government places a heavy
weight on political contributions and when factor ownership is relatively dispersed (respectively,
when a = 1 and ®t = 0:8). Indeed, it is politically easier for the government to tax a speci…c factor
(capital) if the proceeds from this tax are redistributed largely to the politically in‡uential members
of society (i.e., if ®t is large).
21In the absence of a capital subsidy, the domestic capital owners receive the domestic capital rate
of return, which is equal to the international capital rate of return to capital (i.e., rd = r¤). After
27owners always lobby for an FDI tax.
Table 2:
When Only the Capitalist Association is Lobbying
In the Absence of Tari¤-Jumping FDI
¢k = 1 & ¢l = 0
pns sft stp ps WE
a ®t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1 1.35 0.96 0.80 1.19 -1359.50
1 0.3 1.12 0.89 0.82 1.07 -658.80
0.5 1.00 0.83 0.85 0.99 -368.31
0.8 0.89 0.78 0.89 0.90 -170.33
0.1 1.16 0.97 0.87 1.11 -510.90
2 0.3 1.07 0.94 0.89 1.05 -330.16
0.5 1.00 0.90 0.91 0.99 -218.96
0.8 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.93 -118.42
0.1 1.03 1.00 0.97 1.03 -77.06
10 0.3 1.01 0.99 0.97 1.01 -63.15
0.5 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 -50.75
0.8 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.98 -34.57
0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -7.13
100 0.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -6.18
0.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -5.24
0.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.86
Once the capitalist association is allowed to lobby jointly over trade and invest-
ment policy, the optimal policy mix yields a higher FDI tax, combined with a lower
level of trade protection.22 According to our results, the capitalist association is will-
ing to accept a lower equilibrium level of trade protection, in return for a higher
FDI tax.23 This can be seen by comparing, respectively, the optimal level of trade
protection given in column (1) with that given in column (4) and the optimal FDI
tax given in column (2) with that given in column (3). Thus, when the capitalist
association is the main political force, the government can use FDI incentives to lower
the equilibrium level of trade protection.
the capital subsidy, the domestic capital owners receive the net (subsidy-inclusive) domestic rate of
return, which, following the instantaneous foreign capital in‡ow, is equal again to the international
rate of return, or, rn = r¤.
22Again, the optimal policy is a trade tax provided that the politically in‡uential groups represent
less than …fty percent of the population (®t < 0:5). Otherwise, the optimal trade policy turns into
a subsidy.
23In this context, it is easier for the government to yield to the demands of the capitalist association
if it values political contributions highly and if the cost associated with these policies (in terms of
lower government surplus) is not borne primarily by the politically in‡uential members of society
(i.e., if a = 1, ®t = 0:1).
28What happens now if the labor union is the only interest group participating in
the political arena (i.e., ¢l = 1 and ¢k = 0)? The results are given in Table 3
below. In particular, if trade policy is the only policy over which the labor union can
exert political pressure, the optimal policy outcome yields a positive level of trade
protection, provided that the labor union represents less than …fty percent of the
population (®t < 0:5). This is shown in column (1). If, however, the labor union can
only in‡uence the level of FDI incentives, the optimal investment policy yields an
FDI subsidy.24 These results imply that labor bene…ts from both, trade protection
(through the price e¤ect) and FDI subsidies (through the capital in‡ow e¤ect).
Table 3:
When Only the Labor Union is Lobbying
In the Absence of Tari¤-Jumping
¢k = 0 & ¢l = 1
pns sft stp ps WE
a ®t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1 1.35 1.41 1.12 1.40 738.67
1 0.3 1.12 1.27 1.16 1.13 420.85
0.5 1.00 1.17 1.20 0.97 285.52
0.8 0.89 1.06 1.26 0.83 181.02
0.1 1.16 1.21 1.07 1.17 244.00
2 0.3 1.07 1.15 1.09 1.07 215.07
0.5 1.00 1.10 1.11 0.99 191.81
0.8 0.93 1.04 1.14 0.91 163.95
0.1 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.03 36.81
10 0.3 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.01 43.49
0.5 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.00 49.29
0.8 0.98 1.01 1.03 0.98 56.59
0.1 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 3.48
100 0.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.36
0.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.22
0.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.51
When the labor union can lobby jointly over trade and investment policies, it is
able to extract a relatively higher level of trade protection and a relatively lower level
of FDI subsidies. While labor bene…ts from both policies, this result suggests that
it bene…ts more from trade protection than from FDI subsidies. Note, however, that
24Note that it is less costly for the government to implement either of these policies if the burden
associated with it is borne by a relatively small percentage of the politically in‡uential members
of society. Indeed, the highest levels of intervention occur when the government values political
contributions and when factor ownership is relatively concentrated (respectively, when a = 1 and
®t = 0:1).
29the labor union succeeds to persuade the government to implement trade protection
only if the deadweight loss associated with trade protection (in terms of lower gov-
ernment surplus) is not borne by a large percentage of politically in‡uential groups
(i.e., provided that the politically in‡uential groups represent less than …fty percent
of the population (®t < 0:5)). This result shows that the government cannot use
FDI incentives to mitigate political opposition towards trade liberalization, when the
labor union is the most politically in‡uential interest group. On the contrary, when
the labor union is allowed to lobby over both, trade policy and FDI incentives, the
equilibrium outcome yields a higher level of trade protection relative to the case when
it lobbies solely over trade protection.
Finally, let’s consider the case when both, the labor union and the capitalist
association participate actively in the political arena (¢l = 1 and ¢k = 1). The
corresponding results are shown in Table 4. Since both interest groups bene…t from
trade protection, together they are able to extract a higher level of trade protection in
equilibrium. This can be seen by comparing column (1) of Table 4 with, respectively,
column (1) of Table 2 and column (1) of Table 3.
If, however, both policy instruments are available to the interest groups, we have
seen above that the labor union is willing to reduce the level of FDI incentives, in
return for a higher trade protection. The capitalist association, on the other hand,
is willing to receive a lower level of trade protection in exchange for an FDI tax. In
equilibrium, the optimal policy mix combines a (small) FDI tax with a high level of
trade protection. This is illustrated in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. Note that
this FDI tax is smaller than the one the capitalist association would have achieved in
the absence of the labor union. Similarly, the level of trade protection is lower than
the one the labor union would have achieved in the absence of FDI incentives. This
shows that a lobby group can be forced to make trade-o¤s when its interests clash
with those of another lobby group, while it is made more powerful when its interests
collide with those of the other lobby group.25
Regarding our second …nding, our numerical simulations indicate that the pres-
ence or absence of lobby groups greatly in‡uences the welfare e¤ects associated with
allowing interest groups to lobby over two policy instruments (trade and investment)
rather than over a single one (trade protection). In the presence of trade protection,
and if both the capitalist association and the labor union participate in the political
game (¢k = ¢l = 1), the government achieves a higher level of social welfare in the
absence of FDI incentives than in their presence. Thus, according to our model, pro-
vided that all lobby groups participate in the political process, the government does
not achieve a higher level of social welfare by adding FDI incentives as a second policy
instrument. The losses associated with FDI incentives are highest when the govern-
ment places a heavy weight on political contributions and when factor ownership is
25Note that the government is more likely to yield a higher level of trade protection when factor
income is highly concentrated and a higher level of FDI incentives when factor income is highly
dispersed.
30highly concentrated (respectively, when a = 1 and ®t = 0:1).
Table 4:
Assuming Joint Lobbying by Labor Union and Capitalist Association
In the Absence of Tari¤-Jumping
¢k = 1 & ¢k = 1
pns sft stp ps WE
a ®t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1 2.41 1.41 0.91 2.02 -3807.91
1 0.3 1.63 1.27 0.93 1.52 -927.69
0.5 1.31 1.17 0.95 1.28 -325.73
0.8 1.09 1.06 0.98 1.08 -64.01
0.1 1.44 1.21 0.94 1.38 -538.38
2 0.3 1.28 1.15 0.95 1.25 -276.47
0.5 1.17 1.10 0.97 1.16 -141.23
0.8 1.05 1.04 0.99 1.05 -37.66
0.1 1.07 1.04 0.98 1.07 -48.87
10 0.3 1.05 1.03 0.99 1.05 -35.56
0.5 1.04 1.02 0.99 1.04 -28.82
0.8 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 -8.68
0.1 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 -4.13
100 0.3 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.19
0.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.27
0.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.90
If, however, only one of the lobby groups is politically active, the government
can either raise or reduce social welfare by introducing FDI incentives as a second
policy instrument, depending on which interest group is politically active. If labor
is the only politically active lobby group, the government raises social welfare by
introducing FDI incentives as a second policy instrument. These welfare e¤ects are
particularly large when the government places a high value on political contributions
and when factor ownership is relatively concentrated (respectively, when a is low and
when ®t is low). This is because, although labor is able to lobby for a higher level
of trade protection (which is bad for the economy), it is able to lobby for a positive
level of FDI incentives, which induces an in‡ow of foreign capital, and which, in turn,
bene…ts the economy as a whole.
Alternatively, when capital-owners are the main political force, the government
reduces social welfare by adding FDI incentives as a second policy instrument. This is
because, although the government succeeds in reducing the level of trade protection
(which raises welfare), it also imposes an FDI tax, which induces an out‡ow of capital
and which, in turn, reduce social welfare. Finally, if no lobbying takes place, our
model predicts that the government can raise social welfare by adding FDI incentives
31as a second policy instrument, and particularly, when factor ownership is relatively
dispersed (when ®t is high).
Third, our model supports the view that distortionary policies are a by-product
of the government’s sensitivity to political in‡uences. Indeed, if the government were
to maximize solely the well-being of the economy rather than a weighted average of
social welfare and of political contributions, the equilibrium level of trade protection
converges towards free trade and trade policy would become redundant.26 More
generally, our model suggests that it is in the government’s best interest to liberalize
international trade when special interest groups participate in the lobbying process,
when the politically in‡uential groups represent a relatively small fraction of the
population and when the government places a relatively large weight on political
contributions.
Finally, note the crucial role of factor ownership concentration in determining
the magnitude of equilibrium policy outcomes. Since a subsidy reduces government
surplus, the government is willing to impose such a policy only if the burden (in terms
of lower government surplus) is borne by a relatively small percentage of the politically
in‡uential members of society (if ®t is small). In other words, it is more pro…table
for the government to yield to the demands of special interest groups if the politically
in‡uential groups represent a relatively small percentage of the population and hence,
bear a limited share of the deadweight loss associated with the distortionary policy.
Alternatively, since a tax raises government surplus, the government is willing to
impose such a policy if the bene…ts (in terms of higher government surplus) are shared
by a relatively large percentage of the politically in‡uential members of society (if ®t
is large).
This section has illustrated the economic and political factors that determine the
equilibrium level of trade protection, both in the absence and in the presence of
FDI incentives under the assumption that tari¤-jumping FDI does not occur. Let us
examine next how the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI alters these results.
5.2 In the Presence of Tari¤-Jumping FDI
In this section, we show that the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI behavior does not al-
ter signi…cantly the results derived in the absence of tari¤ jumping FDI. Ultimately,
however, the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI may be a less interesting case for the
purpose of our paper. This is because, as suggested by our theoretical results pre-
sented above, the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI annihilates the motivations of the
capitalist association to lobby. Indeed, in the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI, the
capitalist association plays no role in the political decision-making process and only
26Note, however, that according to our model, the absence of political lobbying is not a su¢cient
condition for achieving non-distortionary equilibria. For this, it is essential that the government
targets social welfare rather than the well-being of the politically in‡uential members of society.
32the activities of the labor union in‡uence the equilibrium policy outcomes.27 As a
result, when FDI is used to overcome high trade barriers, the capitalist association
loses its political clout and enters the government’s maximization only indirectly as
a recipient of government surplus. The numerical simulation results for the case of
tari¤-jumping FDI behavior are given in Table 5 below.
Table 5:
When the Labor Union is Lobbying
In the Presence of Tari¤-Jumping FDI
¢l = 1
pns sft stp ps WE
a ®t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1 1.06 1.41 1.37 - -
1 0.3 1.04 1.27 1.25 - -
0.5 1.02 1.17 1.15 3.69 170.92
0.8 1.01 1.06 1.05 1.36 53.19
0.1 1.03 1.21 1.20 - -
2 0.3 1.02 1.15 1.14 - -
0.5 1.01 1.10 1.09 3.20 158.32
0.8 1.01 1.04 1.03 1.35 49.31
0.1 1.01 1.04 1.04 - -
10 0.3 1.00 1.03 1.03 10.50 -2147.00
0.5 1.00 1.02 1.02 2.78 133.44
0.8 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.34 44.20
0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 - -
100 0.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 8.20 -1021.36
0.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.68 125.74
0.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33 42.62
As in the previous section, the optimal level of trade protection in the absence of
FDI incentives (pns) is presented in column (1), while column (2) presents the optimal
level of FDI incentives under free trade (sft): Joint lobbying over trade protection and
FDI policy is introduced in columns (3)-(4). While column (3) presents the optimal
FDI subsidy under trade protection (stp), column (4) presents its associated optimal
level of import tari¤s (ps). The last column depicts WE; the welfare di¤erential
between a regime where lobbying takes place over two policy instruments (trade and
investment policies) and a regime where lobbying takes place over a single policy
instrument (trade policy). Finally, note also that the equilibrium policy outcomes
27This is illustrated in equation (15) below, where the absence of the term ¢k implies that
a capitalist association does not in‡uence the equilibrium trade policy. Similarly, the capitalist
association does not in‡uence the optimal FDI subsidy equation (see equation (17)).
33under trade protection and their corresponding welfare implications are not de…ned
over certain parameter values: These cases are depicted by a dash.
First, let us consider the case where the labor union lobbies solely over trade
protection. Contrary to the results discussed in the previous section, in the presence
of tari¤-jumping FDI, the labor union is always able to extract a positive level of
trade protection, regardless of the dispersion of factor ownership. This is shown in
column (1) of Table 5.28 A positive level of trade protection raises labor income not
only through the standard price e¤ect but also through the capital in‡ow e¤ect. Thus,
in the context of our model, the government …nds it always pro…table to implement
a positive level of trade protection, even if the costs (in terms of lower government
surplus) is borne by a relatively large percentage of the politically in‡uential members
of society (i.e., if ®t is large).
If, however, the labor union lobbies jointly over trade and investment policies,
the optimal policy outcomes under tari¤-jumping FDI are similar to those derived
under non-tari¤ jumping FDI, except that they are larger in absolute value. In
particular, the labor union still prefers to receive a relatively lower FDI subsidy in
return for a relatively higher level of trade protection. This can be seen by comparing,
respectively, the optimal FDI subsidy given in column (3) with that given in column
(2) and the optimal level of trade protection given in column (4) with that given
in column (1). As in the case of non-tari¤-jumping FDI, the government is willing
to introduce trade protection, since this policy not only protects labor income in the
manufacturing sector but also induces an in‡ow of foreign capital. But in the presence
of tari¤-jumping FDI, the government …nds it always politically and economically
bene…cial to impose a positive level of trade protection, even when the government
does not value political contributions (i.e., if a = 100). This is illustrated in the last
quadrant at the bottom of column (4).
In conclusion, the results derived in the presence of tari¤-jumping FDI behavior
do not di¤er signi…cantly from those derived in the absence of tari¤ jumping FDI
and hence, support our earlier …nding: when labor is the main political force, the
government cannot use FDI incentives to mitigate the political constraints associated
with trade liberalization. While we have shown above that this argument holds under
non-tari¤ FDI behavior, this section shows that it is even more relevant under tari¤-
jumping FDI behavior, because trade protection plays the dual role of raising prices
and of attracting foreign capital ‡ows.
28Compare this result with column (1) of Table 3, where the equilibrium trade policy is a tax,
provided that the politically in‡uential groups represent less than …fty percent of the population
(®t < 0:5).
346 Conclusion
It is well known that there are certain conditions under which it is easier for the
government to implement trade liberalization. This paper examines whether FDI
incentives can soften the economic and political constraints associated with trade
liberalization. FDI incentive packages have become common practice as a means to
attract foreign capital. But depending on how these FDI incentives a¤ect the interests
of the politically in‡uential interest groups, their presence can either raise or reduce
the political support for trade liberalization. So far, however, the literature sheds
little light on whether the presence of FDI incentives is likely to facilitate or hamper
further trade liberalization. In fact, to our knowledge no paper has traced directly
the e¤ects of FDI incentives on the politically sustainable equilibrium level of trade
protection.
One of the major contributions of this paper is to introduce the role of capital
in‡ows into the political economy of trade framework pioneered by Grossman and
Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996). While we borrow their maximization technique, we
modify it to analyze the interactions between the equilibrium levels of FDI incentives
and of trade protection. In particular, we highlight how the presence of one policy
instrument (FDI incentives) in‡uences the equilibrium level of another policy (trade
protection).
According to our model, FDI incentives reduce the politically sustainable level of
trade protection when capital-owners are politically organized, while they exacerbate
the process of trade liberalization when labor is the main in‡uential political force.
This dichotomy, which arises from the con‡icting interests pursued by the lobby
groups, highlights how important it is for the government to understand the economic
and political motivations of the lobby groups if it want to promote an environment
conducive to free trade. In particular, our results suggest that the domestic capital
owners favor an FDI tax, while the labor union always lobbies for a higher level
of trade protection. In equilibrium, when the two interest groups lobby over both
policies, the government is in a better position to implement trade liberalization. If,
however, one of the interest groups (say, the labor union) is particularly prominent
on the political stage, it may be harder for the government to override its lobbying
e¤orts and hence, to liberalize trade.
Finally, our model suggests that the highest levels of policy intervention occur
when special interest groups participate in the lobbying process, when these groups
represent a relatively small fraction of the population and when the government
places a relatively large weight on political contributions. This suggests that if a
country’s political framework does not restrain the government from pursuing mostly
political rather than economic objectives, it would be socially optimal to substitute
the government’s discretionary powers over trade policy with a commitment to free
trade.
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